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GOLAN V. GONZALEZ: THE STALEMATE BETWEEN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND COPYRIGHT CONTINUES
Daniel Choi'
In the wake of a long history of copyright decisions that have
been sparse in terms of First Amendment analysis, the Tenth
Circuit in Golan v. Gonzales clearly addresses the First
Amendment. This Recent Development analyzes the decision in
Golan and argues that while the First Amendment concerns were
properly recognized, the ultimate resolution of the Tenth Circuit
was incorrect. The remand to the district court solely on the issue
of whether the Uruguay Round Agreements Act is a content-based
or content-neutral restriction of free speech leaves the district
court with too narrow of a test for the First Amendment issue in
Golan. This Recent Development presents an alternative solution
to the issue presented in Golan and discusses the relevant factors
to be considered upon remand to the district court.
I. INTRODUCTION
Project Gutenberg2 is an online repository of books currently
containing over 100,000 books that can be downloaded at no
charge.' Since books on Project Gutenberg are in an electronic
format ("eBooks"), dozens of classics such as Pride and Prejudice
by Jane Austen, The Raven by Edgar Allen Poe, and The
Adventures of Sherlock Holmes by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle can be
easily downloaded.' Though it might seem silly to provide books
'J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009. Thanks
to my friends and family for their support and patience during the writing of this
Recent Development. Thanks also to Professor Deborah Gerhardt and Professor
Hugh Stevens, and to the fantastic staff of the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology for their valuable feedback and help.
2 Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
See id
4 See id.
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in an electronic format, considering that reading a book on a
computer screen is hardly as comfortable as curling up on a couch,
improved technologies, such as personal digital assistants
("PDAs"), have created the ability to read them anywhere, just like
a paperback book.
Project Gutenberg succeeds partly because many of the works
are part of the public domain and, therefore, have no copyright
restrictions.' Often, copyrights can strictly limit the way a work
can be used, such as preventing the user from downloading the
work onto a PDA or other device for reading. For example, Adobe
eBook Reader, a computer program that can display eBooks, stores
the user's library of eBooks on his or her computer.' While Adobe
eBook Reader currently does not have the functionality to move
eBooks onto a PDA,' once the functionality is added, the program
and the licensing scheme could work together to strictly limit the
use of the eBooks stored in the program, possibly preventing
transfers of eBooks to a PDA.' This limitation does not exist with
eBooks obtained from Project Gutenberg.
Another benefit of Project Gutenberg is its cost. Downloading
and reading eBooks from Project Gutenberg is completely free.
Curious readers can explore books from an author or genre that
they may not have read had they been forced to pay. In contrast to
situations where cost may be prohibitive, Project Gutenberg's
selection of free books allows readers to be adventurous and read
books they know nothing about, perhaps based on little more than
a whim. Further, free and equal access to knowledge contained in
5 Gutenberg: No Cost or Freedom?, http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Gutenberg:
No Cost or Freedom%3F (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
6 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 151 (Penguin Books 2005) (2004).
Now, Adobe makes and distributes an eBook reader program called Adobe
Digital Editions. See Adobe Digital Editions, http://www.adobe.com/products/
digitaleditions (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
7 Adobe Digital Editions: FAQ, http://www.adobe.com/products/digitaleditions
/faq (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology).
8 See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 151.
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eBooks can empower individuals who simply cannot afford to
purchase books.
Other similar projects that make extensive use of works in the
public domain have met mixed success. LibriVox, for example, is
a successful online effort to create audio versions of all the books
in the public domain.' The International Music Score Library
Project ("IMSLP") attempted to collect musical scores of works in
the public domain until it was stopped under threat of a lawsuit.'o
Created by a Canadian student, known as Feldmahler, in his spare
time, IMSLP was the largest collection of public domain musical
scores in the world." A problem, however, arose with IMSLP due
to the difference in copyright term lengths in different countries.
In particular, Austria's copyright terms are twenty years longer
than Canada's; therefore, some of the works which had become
part of the public domain in Canada were still protected under
Austrian copyright. 2 As the musical scores were made available
over the Internet to worldwide users, IMSLP arguably violated the
rights of the Austrian copyright owners.' Universal Edition of
Austria, owners of some of the relevant copyrights, sent
Feldmahler a cease and desist letter that led to his decision to
remove the works from his website. He lamented the end to this
project, stating:
On Saturday October 13, 2007, I received a second Cease and Desist
letter from Universal Edition .... [A]fter lengthy discussions with very
knowledgeable lawyers and supporters, I became painfully aware of the
fact that I, a normal college student, has [sic] neither the energy nor the
money necessary to deal with this issue in any other way than to agree
with the cease and desist, and take down the entire site. I cannot
9 LibriVox, http://librivox.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'o IMSLP, http://www.imslp.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" See Michael Geist, Music Copyright in the Spotlight, BBC NEWS, Nov. 2,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7074786.stm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
12 IMSLP, supra note 10.
'3 Id.
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apologize enough to all IMSLP contributors, who have done so much
for IMSLP in the last two years.14
In a fraction of the time that it took to build the collection, the
threat of a lawsuit shut down one of the greatest repositories of
musical works available in the world.
Lawrence Golan, a teacher and performer of foreign musical
works," also ran afoul of the copyright laws in a similar situation.
Some of the more recognizable composers among the musical
works that Golan performs include Sergei Prokofiev, Dmitri
Shostakovich, and Igor Stravinsky. 6 Golan relied upon, and
believed, that the works should be in the public domain, and he
was partly correct." In the United States, they would have been in
the public domain.'" However, because Congress passed section
514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 9 ("URAA"), the
14 Feldmahler, Open Letter, IMSLP, Dec. 23, 2007, http://imslp.on-wiki.net/
Openletter (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'5 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
6 id.
'7 Id.
18 Id.
"9 Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-80 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
104A, 109 (2000)). Section 104A provides:
(a) Automatic protection and term.-
(1) Term.-
(A) Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in
restored works, and vests automatically on the date of
restoration....
(h) Definitions.-For purposes of this section and section 109(a): ...
(6) The term "restored work" means an original work of
authorship that-
(A) is protected under subsection (a);
(B) is not in the public domain in its source country through
expiration of term of protection;
(C) is in the public domain in the United States due to-
(i) noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time
by United States copyright law, including failure of
renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to comply
with any manufacturing requirements;
(ii) lack of subject matter protection in the case of sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972; or
(iii) lack of national eligibility;
[VOL. 9: 219222
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works were figuratively lifted out of the public domain and had
their copyrights in the United States restored. For Golan and
others similarly situated, the restoration of the copyrights meant
that certain works could not be performed without paying a
licensing fee. Often, the fee was high enough to be prohibitive of
their musical expression.20
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case resulting
from Golan's story.2' The court recognized a conflict between the
copyrights in question and Golan's right to free speech.2 2 Though
not always obvious, "[c]opyright law restricts speech."" It can
control creative expression and does so regularly-"[i]t restricts
what writers may write, what painters may paint, what musicians
may compose." 24  Therefore, anytime copyright law is used to
prevent someone from expressing himself or herself in a particular
way, that person should ask whether his or her constitutional right
to freedom of speech has been inappropriately restrained.
The court decided that there was a valid free speech issue and
remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the
restraint on free speech, in this case the URAA, was a content-
based restriction or a content-neutral restriction in order to
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.25  This Recent
Development discusses the soundness of the court's decision to
remand the case in Golan v. Gonzales, and argues that the standard
provided for the lower court to resolve the issue was not the
appropriate standard. Part II of this Recent Development provides
(D) has at least one author or rightholder who was, at the time
the work was created, a national or domiciliary of an
eligible country, and if published, was first published in
an eligible country and not published in the United States
during the 30-day period following publication in such
eligible country[.]
20 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1183.
21 Id. at 1182.
22 Id. at 1196 (remanding the case to the district court to analyze the First
Amendment concerns).
23 Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2431 (1998).
24 Id.
25 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
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an overview of the relevant cases leading up to Golan. Part III
discusses the positive aspects of the Golan decision. Part IV
critiques the resolution of the issue by the Golan court and
proposes a different method to resolve the matter. Finally, Part V
highlights some concerns that may surface upon remand.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Genesis of Copyright
Copyright law has been around for hundreds of years.26 Long
before copyright law developed, however, the public domain has
existed. If a work is in the public domain, anyone may freely use
the work in any way without asking permission.2 7 Typically, what
causes a work protected by copyright to move into the public
domain is a passage of time sufficient for the copyright term to
expire.2 Under the current United States copyright scheme,
copyrights usually expire seventy years after the author's death.2 9
While the switch from a work that is copyrighted to one in the
public domain should be painless, it is often met with resistance.
For example, when the public domain was first officially created
after 1774 in England, the copyright owners and the public
disagreed as to whether the creation of the public domain was
appropriate.30 The public favored the public domain because "[f]or
the first time in Anglo-American History, the legal control over
creative works expired, and the greatest works in English history-
including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and
Bunyan-were free of legal restraint."' On the other hand, the
content owners opposed the creation of the public domain because
it wiped out the value of their previously copyrighted content.3 2 A
recount of the event stated, "By the above decision . .. near
26 The first formal copyright statute was the Statute of Anne, which was
established in 1710. See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 86.
27 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189-90.
28 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
29 Id.
30 See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 92.
" See id. at 93.
32 See id.
[VOL. 9: 219224
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200,000 pounds worth of what was honestly purchased at public
sale, and which was yesterday thought property is now reduced to
nothing."" Despite the protests of copyright holders regarding
limited copyright terms and the entrance of works into the public
domain, the copyright system that has evolved protects creative
expression for "limited Times" and upon expiration of the
copyright, moves the work into the public domain.34
B. Eldred
In 2003, Eldred v. Ashcroft" asked whether Congress had the
power to extend the term of copyrights under the Copyright Term
Extension Act ("CTEA") for an additional twenty years. In
addition to extending the term for newly created works, the CTEA
retroactively extended the term for works that had already received
copyright protection.3 ' The authority arguably came from the
Constitution's Progress Clause which states, "Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science .. . by securing [to
Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right to their ...
Writings .... ."3 At issue in the case was the phrase "limited
Times," which Eldred argued was not being obeyed by Congress's
multiple extensions of copyright terms.39 The Supreme Court
reasoned that, technically, even a copyright term for the life of the
author plus seventy years is still "limited," even when retroactively
applied, and thus Congress had acted within its power in
promulgating the CTEA.40
More relevant to this discussion, the Eldred Court also had to
grapple with the question of whether an extension of the copyright
term inappropriately abridged the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech.4 1 Since any expressive work is considered speech,
3" See id.
34 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
" 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
36 See id. at 204.
37 See id.
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39 See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 218.
40 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
41 See id at 218-19.
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anything that limits the expressive work, even when copying
someone else's work, is a regulation of speech.42 The Court
addressed this question in two ways. First, the Court
acknowledged that First Amendment rights of free speech are
protected through the copyright law's built-in protections of the
idea-expression dichotomy4 3 and fair use." Second, in what some
consider the "key holding,"45 the Court stated that "when ...
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."46
The logical inference of this statement is that if Congress does alter
the "traditional contours of copyright protection,"47 then further
First Amendment scrutiny is necessary. In other words, the built-
in protections of copyright law may not be enough to preserve an
individual's First Amendment rights in certain situations that alter
42 Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 2431.
43 The idea-expression dichotomy means that copyright law protects the actual
expression, but not the underlying ideas. See Harper & Row Publ'rs v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). For example, a painter may paint a picture
that depicts flowers. The actual expression, the painting, would be protected
under copyright law, whereas the underlying idea, the flowers, would not be
protected. See id. This principle would allow others to freely paint pictures of
flowers without infringing the first individual's copyrights.
44 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
45 Jack Balkin, Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Unconstitutional
Under Eldred v. Ashcroft?, BALKINIZATION, Jan. 17, 2003, http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2003/01/is-digital-millennium-copyright-act.html (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
46 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Garick, Free
Speech Sometimes Trumps Copyright, WIRED, Sept. 11, 2007, http://www.wired.
com/politics/onlinerights/commentary/circuitcourt/2007/09/circuitcourt_0911 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Garick comments
on Kahle v. Gonzalez, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), which asks whether the
shift from an "opt-in" to an "opt-out" system of copyright is a change in the
traditional contours of copyright protection:
In Kahle, the issue is Congress' change from a self-selecting system of
copyright, where people had to register and give notice to indicate that
they wanted copyright protection .... This change from an opt-in to an
opt-out system has produced generations of "orphan works"-creative
works that are still under copyright, but for which owners are absent or
prohibitively expensive to find.
Id.
' Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
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copyright's "traditional contours."48 What exactly does the phrase
"traditional contours" mean? Golan v. Gonzalez presses this
question.
C. Golan
With the "key holding"49 of Eldred in place, Golan explored
the meaning of the Supreme Court's phrase, "traditional contours
of copyright protection.""o Lawrence Golan, a performer of foreign
works in the public domain, was unable to legally express the same
musical pieces that he once could.' Other plaintiffs in Golan used
works in the United States public domain to create derivative
works.52 The URAA, however, resulted in the restoration of the
copyrights of some of the works that Golan and the other plaintiffs
used to make a living. For Golan, it meant that his expression was
barred. For the other plaintiffs, it meant their new derivative
works were no longer protectable since they made unlawful use of
copyrighted works." Golan and the other plaintiffs challenged
§ 104A of the Copyright Act, which enacted section 514 of the
URAA,54 on grounds that the URAA altered a "traditional
contour[ ]" and therefore conflicted with the First Amendment."
Essentially, the URAA states that some works in the United
States which may have fallen into the public domain can have their
copyright status restored so long as several conditions are met:
48 Id.
49 Balkin, supra note 45.
50 Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2007).
5' See id. at 1182.
52 See id. at 1193. A derivative work is defined as:
A . .. work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 103.
54 See id. § 104A.
" Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185-86.
227SPING 2008]
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
(1) the work must be of foreign origin,"6 (2) the work must be "in
the public domain in the United States,"" (3) the work must still be
protected under copyright law of the country that the work
originated from," and (4) the reason the work is in the public
domain of the United States must be "due to . . . noncompliance
with formalities" that United States copyright law required to
invoke copyright protection.59 If these conditions are met, then the
work is lifted out of the public domain and has its copyright status
restored in the United States.60 As a result, the work, which could
previously be used by the public without restriction, once again has
full copyright protection.
The district court in Golan decided "that Congress acted within
its authority" when enacting the URAA. 6 1 Particularly persuasive
for the lower court was the notion that Golan and the other
plaintiffs were "free to contract with copyright holders for
permission to disseminate the works."62 This reasoning was
sufficient for the district court to find against the plaintiffs.
When Golan and the other plaintiffs appealed the decision, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals saw the case differently. The
Tenth Circuit sought to address the question of what constitutes
"traditional contours of copyright protection."64 The court
reasoned that "one of these traditional contours is the principle that
once a work enters the public domain, no individual-not even the
creator-may copyright it."65 The Tenth Circuit neither upheld the
URAA, nor struck it down. Instead, the Tenth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court and ordered that the district court
determine whether § 104A is an appropriate regulation of free
s6 See § 104A(h)(6)(B)-(C).
Id. § 104A(h)(6)(C).
Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B).
'9 Id. § 104A(h)(6)(C)(i).
60 See id. § 104A(h)(6).
61 Golan v. Gonzalez, No. 01-B-1854, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *43
(D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2005).
62 Id. at *48.
63 See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
64Id. at 1183.
61 Id. at 1184.
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speech.66 The district court will base its decision upon whether the
regulation of free speech is content-based" or content-neutral.6 8
Previous case law teaches that "[c]ontent-based restrictions on
speech are those which 'suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content.' "69 By
deduction, regulation that is not content-based is content-neutral
since it "only incidentally burden[s] speech."" The classification
of content-based or content-neutral then dictates the applicable
level of scrutiny."
In previous Supreme Court decisions such as Eldred, the Court
has rejected the argument that additional First Amendment review
of laws affecting free speech is necessary beyond the traditional
copyright safeguards of fair use and the idea-expression
dichotomy.72 Golan, on the other hand, stands for the proposition
that the traditional copyright law safeguards of First Amendment
values are inadequate when works are removed from the public
domain."
III. A PERFECT 10[TH CIRCUIT]
In Golan, the Tenth Circuit handed down a well-reasoned
analysis of the URAA and its relationship to "traditional contours"
of copyright law.74 The Tenth Circuit realized that the Supreme
Court left open the question of whether legislation that alters the
6 6 Id. at 1196.
67 See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643,
657 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Content-based restrictions on speech, those which
suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of
its content are subject to the most exacting scrutiny." (quoting Z.J. Gifts D-2,
L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998))).
68 See Grace United Methodist Church, 451 F.3d at 657 ("[C]ontent neutral
regulations that only incidentally burden speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny.").
69 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Grace United Methodist Church, 451
F.3d at 657).
70 Grace United Methodist Church, 451 F.3d at 657.
" See id.
72 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
7 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1188.
74 Id. at 1187.
29SPRING 2008]
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"traditional contours of copyright protection" is subject to
additional First Amendment scrutiny." Recognizing the need to
determine the plain meaning of a "traditional contour[]" of
copyright law,"6 the court saw the historical treatment of copyrights
by Congress as relevant to the inquiry." By allowing the removal
of works from the public domain, the court decided that the URAA
does change a traditional contour." In other words, the Tenth
Circuit used the history of copyright law as a standard of
expectation. Traditionally, the expectation was that once a work
enters into the public domain it stays there." Thus, the court
concluded that the URAA changed that standard of expectation.
Particularly relevant to the discussion is the natural progression
of the life of a copyright, which determines part of the "traditional
contours."o The basic lifecycle of a copyright involves the
"progress[ion] from 1) creation; 2) to copyright; 3) to the public
domain.""' In the context of the URAA, "the copyright sequence
no longer necessarily ends with the public domain: indeed, it may
begin there."82 Since the URAA offers copyright protection to
"works in the public domain, the URAA has altered the ordinary
copyright sequence.""
It should be clear that the alteration of the copyright sequence
is indeed a significant departure from the traditional standard of
expectation of copyright law for two reasons: (1) society relies on
the natural progression of copyright law, and (2) alterations to the
natural progression affect the all-important public domain."
" Id. at 1188.
1 Id. at 1189.
n Id.78 Id. at 1192.
79 Id. at 1187.
80 d. at 1189.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Id.
84 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224-25 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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With regard to society's reliance on this natural progression of
copyrights," § 104A would cause the copyright lifecycle to
potentially involve an additional stage: creation to copyright to
public domain, followed once again by copyright protection. One
of the safe assumptions, or "bedrock principle[s]" of intellectual
property is the notion "that works in the public domain remain in
the public domain."86 Since the beginning of copyright law in the
United States, entrance into the public domain has been a bright
line for when copyright protection ends." The role of the public
domain transcends copyright law as other areas of intellectual
property also acknowledge its importance." Regarding potential
liability for infringement, the public domain is a safe harbor. One
is not required to ask permission to make use of works in the
public domain. The safe harbor of the public domain is the reason
that theaters can perform Shakespeare's immortal Romeo and
Juliet, Bach's legendary Brandenburg Concertos, or orchestras can
perform Mozart's Don Giovanni without worrying whether such an
act infringes the copyrights of others. For the same reason,
websites like Project Gutenberg" should be able to thrive and be
certain that their efforts will not be in vain, as far as copyright
infringement is concerned. Unquestionably, the URAA changes
this certainty, and the Tenth Circuit is correct in recognizing that
the change alters the "traditional contours" of copyright law.
Furthermore, the change caused by the URAA legislation is
significant not only because it shifts the public's expectation
regarding a traditional certainty, but the change also arguably
85 Id.
86 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1192.
8 Id. at 1194 n.4 ("[T]he public domain likely presented a 'bright line'
because once '[s]omething ... has already gone into the public domain []other
individuals or companies or entities may then have acquired an interest in, or
rights to be involved in disseminating [the work.]"' (second and subsequent
alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
88 See Graham et al. v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("Congress may
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available.").
89 See Project Gutenberg, supra note 2.
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targets an integral part of copyright law: the public domain.90 The
Tenth Circuit recognized that a key interested party is the public.9 1
It noted, "The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor."9 2 Further, "the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."" At the passage of the Copyright Act of
1909, Congress noted "that copyright was not designed 'primarily'
to 'benefit' the 'author' or 'any particular class of citizens,
however worthy' . . . . Rather, under the Constitution, copyright
was designed 'primarily for the benefit of the public[.]' "" The
URAA, with the ability to lift works out of the public domain,
creates a rift in a standard to which the public has grown
accustomed, and then damages the public by denying the free use
of works formerly in the public domain.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit appropriately disregards the district
court's reasoning that plaintiffs can contract around the URAA as a
valid protection of free speech. The Tenth Circuit was correct
since the district court's reasoning belittles or even ignores the
First Amendment concerns altogether. Golan could obtain the
rights to perform the works he wanted by a licensing agreement,
but this rationale ignores that a valid protection of First
Amendment rights would not require a party to ask permission at
all. Asking permission to say what an individual has the
constitutional right to say would be, contrary to the district court's
opinion, "too onerous a constraint upon their free expression of
ideas."95
While the Tenth Circuit correctly acknowledged the change in
the "traditional contours of copyright protection," it seems
90 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9' Golan, 501 F.3d at 1188.
92 Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
9 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9 Golan v. Gonzalez, No. 01-B-1854, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *48
(D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2005).
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uncertain as to what the next step should entail." Instead of
deciding the constitutionality of the URAA, the Tenth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the
URAA is a content-based or content-neutral regulation of free
speech."
IV. THE COPYRIGHT DECISION
A. First Amendment vs. Copyright
On remand, if the district court determines the URAA to be a
content-based regulation of free speech, then strict scrutiny
applies.98 Under strict scrutiny, the URAA must be narrowly
tailored to the ends it proposes to achieve.99 However, if the
URAA is found to be content-neutral, then intermediate scrutiny
applies.'o Under intermediate scrutiny, a less exacting law than a
narrowly tailored one would suffice. 0 ' One consequence of the
Tenth Circuit decision is that the remand limits the district court
only to the narrow question of whether the regulation is content-
based or content-neutral.'02 The order by the Tenth Circuit is
deficient because it only provides the option of choosing between
"content-based" and "content-neutral" classification when, in the
face of the First Amendment, copyright law demands a more
96 Orin Kerr, Golan v. Gonzales and First Amendment Limits on Copyright
Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Sept. 6, 2007, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive 2007 09 02-2007 09 08.shtml# 1189051800 (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) ("The Tenth Circuit concluded that the
Act did in fact alter those traditional contours by taking material that had been in
the public domain and then subjecting them to copyright. But the panel wasn't
really sure what to do next; they remanded to the district court to figure out how
to 'subject' the law to 'further' First Amendment scrutiny.").
9 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
98 Id.
99 See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643,
657 (10th Cir. 2006).
1oo Id.
'o' Id.
102 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
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complex analysis than a simple two-tiered test based on whether
the URAA targets specific content.o3
It is undeniable that a tension exists between the First
Amendment and copyright law: "Copyright law restricts speech
.... If your speech copies ours, and if the copying uses our
'expression,' . . . the speech can be enjoined and punished, civilly
and sometimes criminally." 04 The right of one person to control
his or her own creative expression will directly overlap another's
right to "speak" that same expression. In Golan, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the URAA requires First Amendment scrutiny
beyond the typical analysis of fair use and the idea-expression
dichotomy.o' The court realized that in reality, there are situations
where fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy are insufficient
to protect all of the instances where free speech and copyright may
intersect. For example, "[d]uring the first year anniversary of the
9-11 attacks, people [publicly] read aloud the Gettysburg Address
... and they did so because they believed that it was the best way
to convey what they felt at the time."' 06 These people, much like
Golan, believed that, "[s]ometimes the best way to express your
point is through using the words of others, or .. . expanding on the
words of others."o' Arguably, one powerful way to teach foreign
musical works involves access to performances of these works.
Another poignant instance where copyright protections overlapped
with free speech involved the film clip capturing the assassination
of former President John F. Kennedy: "It is hard to imagine a
103 See Jack Balkin, Golan v. Gonzales-How the First Amendment Limits
Copyright Law, BALKINIZATION, Sept. 5, 2007, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/
09/golan-v-gonzales-how-first-amendment.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) ("Copyright law does not fit into tiers of scrutiny
analysis. It is more like libel law which is clearly content based but has never
been thought to be subject to scrutiny analysis.").
'0 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-66 (1998).
'os Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184.
06 Jack Balkin, Mickey in Chains, Part II, or Why the Court Got It Wrong in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, BALKINIZATION, Jan. 15, 2003, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2003/01/mickey-in-chains-part-ii-or-why-court.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
107 Id.
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more compelling case for requiring free access to a copyrighted
work."'" With the nation's President assassinated, "[t]o have a
meaningful public debate, it seemed crucial to test and illustrate
opposing theories against the actual visual record of the events."' 09
The United States bubbled with speculation as to what exactly
happened to its President, and "bare ideas and facts" would not be
enough to test those theories."o The public needed direct access to
the raw facts, but the only source of facts available, a movie clip,
was copyrighted material.
B. The Appropriate Test
While the Tenth Circuit recognized that there are instances
where the built-in protections of copyright law are insufficient, the
court was too narrow in its thinking as to what sort of scrutiny
should by applied when First Amendment rights must be
considered."' Of course the content-based and content-neutral
distinction is one way of scrutinizing regulations of speech, but the
Tenth Circuit was arguably incorrect in stating that the URAA
must fit into one of these two categories. The appropriate
treatment of copyright law requires more than the simple content-
based or content-neutral test outlined by the Tenth Circuit."2
Whether a law is content-based or content-neutral is a nuanced
inquiry because of the danger that the term "content-based" may be
confused with the idea of being solely "viewpoint-based."'' To
determine whether a law is content-based, the court must ask
whether it is either viewpoint-based or subject-matter-based."' If
it is either of these, the law will be considered content-based."'
For example, if a law were passed that specifically restricted all
08 Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on
the Protection ofExpression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 300-01 (1979).
109 Id.
"o Id. Fair use actually justified access to the frames, but the First
Amendment could have been used as well. See id.
.. See Balkin, supra note 103.
112 Id.
"1 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 104, at 186.
114 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 934 (2d ed. 2002).
"' Id. at 934-35.
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copyrighted material that contained references to enemy countries
of the United States, then this law would be considered content-
based because it regulates based on a particular viewpoint-a bias
against enemy countries. This law would likely be considered
subject-matter-based as well, but being viewpoint-based is
sufficient for the law to be considered content-based.' 6 As a
result, strict scrutiny will apply.
Most, if not all, laws affecting copyrights will not be considered
viewpoint-based as long as no bias exists."' However, the inquiry
cannot stop with this determination. The courts must also decide
whether a law like the URAA is subject-matter-based and therefore
content-based. This distinction is crucial to prevent applying de
facto intermediate scrutiny to all copyright law that is subject to
First Amendment analysis and being overly permissive of
unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.
The further question here is not only whether the law is
content-based or content-neutral, but whether a simple two-prong
classification is even appropriate. It is not: "Because virtually all
human interaction takes place through speech, the First
Amendment cannot offer all speech the same degree of protection.
Rather, judges must apply different protective presumptions in
different contexts[.]""' A more elaborate test than the two-
pronged one chosen by the Tenth Circuit should be implemented
because of the role of the public domain. In Golan, the public
domain was the source of the speech that the plaintiff wanted to
express."9 The public domain served as a repository of creative
expression. Few other contexts of free speech involve the public
domain, a repository that legally belongs exclusively to the public.
Arguably, the public domain represents both free speech and
creativity. While the analysis of the URAA and its effect on free
speech can be an independent inquiry, its potential effect on
creativity is clear. For Golan, the inability to teach through
performance means the quality of musical education could be
116 See id.
11 See id.
" Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1973 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"9 See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
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adversely affected. For the plaintiffs who created derivative works
from restored foreign works, their creative contributions will no
longer be protected since they made an unlawful use of the
restored works-a use which was previously lawful.120  This
potential harm to creativity should be taken into account to
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.
C. A New Test
The following is a better solution for determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be used. Using some of the fair use
factors as a model, 2 ' a balancing test should be implemented to
determine the scrutiny for examining copyright law subject to First
Amendment concerns. The balancing test should weigh: (1) the
purpose and character of the legislation, (2) the degree of deviation
from the traditional contour, and (3) the reliance of the public on
the affected speech. The purpose and character inquiry should
examine whether the law was enacted to the obvious detriment of
either copyright law or the First Amendment. Part of the purpose
of the law should also be the furtherance of an established
copyright policy. Regarding prong two, the greater the deviation,
the more likely the law should be carefully scrutinized to ensure
First Amendment rights are not impermissibly abridged. Finally,
examining reliance by the public on the affected speech would
reveal any damage inflicted upon the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech. If it is determined that the law's purpose is
questionable, the degree of deviation from the traditional contour is
great, and the public heavily relies on the speech in question, then
strict scrutiny should apply. If fewer of these factors are an issue,
a lower standard of scrutiny, such as intermediate or rational-basis,
would be appropriate. A balancing test has the benefit of forcing
the courts to keep the public domain in mind, primarily through
prong three. Additionally, the fair use balancing test is a useful
model because it represents a compromise. Fair use is a
compromise between absolute copyright protection and allowing
certain uses that have sound policy purposes, such as education or
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
121 See id. § 107.
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news reporting.122  Similarly, the proposed test would be a
compromise between absolute copyright control and absolute First
Amendment protection. Compromise is necessary since it is
certain that copyright and free speech may overlap. After all,
when the Constitution demands that we "promote the Progress of
Science," that progress is meant to be made with the public in
mind.123
Under the proposed test, the URAA would likely be subject to
strict scrutiny. The purpose and character of the law works to the
obvious detriment of First Amendment interests. Simply because
parts of the public domain have not yet been "spoken" does not
mean it is unworthy of First Amendment protection. The degree of
deviation from the traditional contours in this case is significant as
it usurps the public's standard of expectation regarding the public
domain. Lastly, the reliance of the public is clear since the
plaintiffs in Golan rely on what they thought were public domain
works to educate others and create derivative works. Because the
three factors fall in favor of closer scrutiny, the URAA would be
subject to strict scrutiny under the proposed test.
V. THE REMAND
Upon remand, the lower court could go either way on whether
the URAA is content-based or content-neutral legislation. The
Tenth Circuit supplied the test the district court must apply, stating
"[c]ontent-based restrictions on speech are those which 'suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because
of its content.' "124 To determine whether the URAA is content-
based, the lower court will also ask whether it is either viewpoint-
based or subject-matter-based.'25 The URAA will likely not be
held to be viewpoint-based because the URAA does not restore
copyrights based on the substantive content of the public domain
122 id
123 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 247 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
124 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Grace United Methodist Church v. City
of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 657 (10th Cir. 2006)).
125 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
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material. However, it is uncertain whether the URAA could be
considered subject-matter-based. It targets only public domain
materials that have fallen into the public domain because the works
failed to meet particular copyright formalities. Thus, the works are
selected on the basis of a technicality as opposed to the subject
matter of the works. On the other hand, the URAA targets solely
public domain works of foreign origin, which is arguably a form of
selection based on the copyrighted material's subject matter. If the
URAA is held to be based on subject matter, then it will be
considered content-based and will have to pass strict scrutiny to be
upheld.'2 6 Conversely, if deemed content-neutral, intermediate
scrutiny will apply.'2 7 The URAA should fail strict scrutiny as it is
over-inclusive in its reach by restoring copyrights in works that
have little or no commercial value and works where the author
may not truly care to restore the copyright of the work.'28
However, even if the URAA would fail strict scrutiny analysis, it
has a good chance of passing intermediate scrutiny which is a less
exacting standard.
Beyond the remand, the most worrisome aspect of the URAA's
impact on the public domain is the prospect that the analysis
regarding "traditional contours" is inconsequential for two reasons:
(1) the "traditional contours" test itself may be doomed,'2 9 and
(2) Congress's treaty power may be enough to uphold the law
irrespective of First Amendment concerns.'3 0 First, some scholars
have speculated that the "traditional contours" test expounded by
the Tenth Circuit actually works against the public domain and will
therefore eventually lead to more expansive copyright law and
fewer protections of free speech.'"' It is even possible that the
126 Grace United Methodist Church, 451 F.3d at 657.
127 Id.
128 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129 Balkin, supra note 103.
130 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007).
131 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 103. Balkin observes:
The problem is that if we interpret the "traditional contours of
copyright law" to require only that copyright laws basically resemble
previous versions, only with longer terms and more constricted
exemptions, the "traditional contours" test will not do much work.
That is, if defenders of expansive copyright laws are able to show that
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"traditional contours" test was never meant to have the sort of
force and "broad meaning" that the Tenth Circuit believes.'32
Second, even if "traditional contours" have been altered by the
URAA, the treaty power of Congress could be seen as a source of
authority to allow the URAA to stand.' 3 A policy recognized in
the past to justify copyright legislation on several occasions
involves "an American effort to conform to an important
international treaty like the Berne Convention."'3 4 The same
reasoning could be applied in this case since § 104A was also
passed pursuant to the Berne Convention.'
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court's expansive copyright decision in
Eldred, the Tenth Circuit in Golan manages to use part of Eldred
to give hope to those who advocate for a safe public domain where
works remain forever for the benefit of future authors and creators
to make use of those works.'36 In Golan, the Tenth Circuit made it
clear that one of the "bedrock principle[s]" of copyright law is that
works moving to the public domain are traveling with a one-way
ticket with no hope of return.' The public can confidently use
works in the public domain when a bright-line rule determines
what works are part of the public domain, as opposed to a more
complex scheme involving restoration of works from the public
domain to copyrighted status once again.
When the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court,
it provided a narrow test that will require the district court to
new laws create differences only in degree rather than kind, and that
they are part of a gradual historical progression of increased copyright
protection, arguments from traditional contours may be more difficult
to make.
Id.
132 Kerr, supra note 96.
"3 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 n.5 ("Although not mentioned by the parties,
Congress's treaty, commerce, and takings powers may provide Congress with
the authority to enact § 514.").
134 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 259 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"3 See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
136 See Balkin, supra note 103.
.. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1192.
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categorize the URAA as either content-based or content-neutral.
Given the unique qualities of copyright law, which involve the
public domain, a more nuanced test should be applied. Copyright
law should not be left with such a simple test for the purposes of
determining the appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny.
Be warned though-the Tenth Circuit left several questions
open that may ultimately vitiate the First Amendment concerns in
Golan."' In addition to the question of what level of scrutiny
should apply, the Tenth Circuit hints that even in the face of
exacting scrutiny, the treaty power of Congress may provide the
district court with a way to avoid the conflict altogether.' But for
now, long live the public domain.
Id. at 1196.
39 Id. at 1196 n.5.
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